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Lowe, Nathan R. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2013. The Competitive Effect of 
Vouchers on the Performance of Traditional Public Schools in Hamilton County, Ohio. 
Major Professor: Dr. Marilyn A. Hirth, Purdue University 
The purpose of this quantitative study is to determine the effect that educational choice, 
in the form of vouchers, is having on the performance of traditional public schools in 
Hamilton County, Ohio.  The threat of losing students to vouchers creates a sense of 
competition for students, and ultimately the dollars that are attached to them.  This 
competition is relatively new to public education and is being promoted by state 
legislators as a catalyst for public school improvement.  All data sets were obtained from 
publically available data on the Ohio Department of Education website between 2001 and 
2012.  Between 2001 and 2012, 107 Hamilton County schools had data points for each 
year.  Twenty-five (25) of those schools were threatened by voucher eligibility in 2006 
and eighty-two (82) were exempt from the threat of vouchers.  The twenty-five schools 
threatened by vouchers increased an average of ten (10) Performance Index points 
between 2007 and 2012.  The 82 non-threatened schools only increased an average of one 
(1) Performance Index point.  The voucher-threatened schools closed the achievement 
gap 17 Performance Index points between 2001 and 2012.  When the voucher effect was 
compared in a multiple regression to other factors that may contribute to change in 
performance, only the voucher variable was significant.  Going from a non-voucher 
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eligible school to a voucher eligible school is associated with a 19% increase in PIS from 
2007 to 2012.  Schools that are eligible for vouchers are not closing at a significantly 
faster rate than non-voucher eligible schools in Hamilton County, Ohio based on a Chi-
Square Test of Independence.  The results of this study indicate that the traditional public 
schools in Hamilton County Ohio have responded positively to the threat of competition 
from vouchers.  The EdChoice (voucher) program seems to be having a positive effect on 
the performance scores of previously failing public schools.  Recommendations were 














 How do the following words apply to the traditional public education system:  
competition, capitalism, free market economy, supply and demand, marketing, and 
choice?  In the past twenty years these words have begun to play a major role in the 
public education system in the United States of America.  For the bulk of the twentieth 
century, public education was associated with words that fit more with a social welfare 
economic philosophy: words like free, equal, compulsory, state-controlled, and 
guaranteed.  Most people, especially those without disposable income, had only one 
option when it came to education: the public school down the street.  There were no other 
viable options.  Private schools were reserved for middle or upper class citizens who 
could afford the cost of tuition.   
 All that changed on the national level on June 27, 2002, when the United States 
Supreme Court ruled in Zelman et al, v. Simmons-Harris et al, “that vouchers did not 
violate the Establishment Clause, thus leading the way for voucher programs throughout 
the United States” ("NCSL," 2012).  Education vouchers are public monies, placed in the 
hands of parents and students, to be spent on private education at the school of their 
choice.  The first city to adopt a school voucher plan was Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  In 
1990, when it started, only private schools with no religious affiliation could receive the 
vouchers, and consequently, only several hundred students took advantage of the 
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program.  Within ten years, vouchers had been extended to parochial schools in 
Milwaukee and the number of students jumped to 10,000 (Peterson, Campbell, & 
Brookings Institution, 2001).   
 Since then, Louisiana, Ohio, Indiana, and the District of Columbia have passed 
legislation granting vouchers to low-income families.  Several privately funded voucher 
programs have also been introduced in major metropolitan areas.  Seven states: Florida, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Ohio, and Utah, have endorsed legislation 
allowing voucher support for all special needs students who wish to attend non-public 
schools ("NCSL," 2012).   
The Voucher Debate 
 
The National Conference of State Legislators (2012) outlines the arguments on 
both sides of the voucher debate. Proponents of the vouchers suggest that the system 
provides more educational opportunities for low-income students.  At the same time, 
vouchers should create an incentive for public schools to improve as a result of 
competition with parochial and private schools.  Proponents also believe that vouchers 
will result in a better education for students because bureaucracy will be reduced and 
parents will gain more influence and control in educational decision making.   
On the other side of the debate, opponents claim that vouchers serve to weaken 
public schools by siphoning much needed monies away from traditional public schools.   
Then states give those monies to private schools with little accountability attached for 
how they are spent.  Some opponents argue that the amount of money provided through 
vouchers is insufficient to provide real equality in educational access when only a 
fraction of the tuition cost is covered.  Because of the limited funds offered through 
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vouchers, low income students still do not have the opportunity to attend the most 
expensive private schools.  Finally opponents assert that vouchers serve to lower the 
quality of public education by drawing away the most informed parents and students, 
thereby creating increased segregation along socioeconomic lines ("NCSL," 2012).   
In spite of the arguments on both sides of the voucher debate, it is interesting to 
note that what started out as a movement to increase educational opportunities for parents 
has become a tool for the educational reform of traditional public schools (TPSs).  This 
issue is the focus of the following research.   
Statement of the Problem 
 
As each state wrestles with the voucher question in the next few years, these are a 
few of the questions that legislators and education committees are asking:  What is the 
effect when competition is introduced to the public education system?  Do TPSs improve 
their program to attract or keep students?  Do teachers work harder to produce engaging 
lessons and higher performing students?  Do superintendents and principals provide more 
professional development for staff, better resources for quality learning, and marketing 
plans to promote their accomplishments?  Are public schools really “weakened” by 
voucher programs as the opponents claim?  Do the students who are “left behind” in the 
TPS suffer educational or social harm as a result of this new form of competition?  What 
data could we study to find out the answers to these questions?   
These questions and others have motivated the following research.  The answers 
to these questions will determine the future of public education in the United States of 
America, and possibly the world.  If the competitive effect of vouchers, charters, and 
expanded educational choice can be shown to drive the improvement of public education, 
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then it will be implemented as a tool in each state of the union.  It will be embraced by 
both political parties as a legitimate method of educational improvement.  It will gain 
momentum and be used by increasingly larger percentages of the population.   
If, however, the competitive effect of school choice is not legitimized as a catalyst 
for public school reform, then it will most likely remain a tool used by a small segment 
(traditionally less than 1%) of our population to equalize educational choice.  It will only 
be accepted in education circles as an alternative option for parents at lower socio-
economic levels.  In other words, vouchers will primarily be used as a means to equal the 
playing field for relatively few impoverished families, but will not be an accepted method 
of educational reform. 
My own educational experience is split evenly between public and private 
education.  I spent my elementary, secondary, and undergraduate work in private, 
parochial schools.  Then I spent the next 15 years in public education as a teacher, coach, 
and administrator; and I am working on my second post-graduate degree from a public 
institution.  Now I work for a private, faith-based alternative school which partners with 
public schools to provide drop-out prevention programming.  Based on my diverse 
background and experience I am well positioned as a researcher to understand and 
explore both sides of this issue.  
Although vouchers are relatively new to education, the concept of choice is not.  
The public charter school concept has enjoyed much wider acceptance as it moved from 
state to state in the past twenty-five years, and excellent data are available on charter 
schools to help researchers make claims about their effectiveness (Bohte, 2004; Booker, 
Gilpatric, Gronberg, & Jansen, 2008; Holmes, DeSimone, & Rupp, 2006; Lubienski & 
5 
 
Weitzel, 2010; Ni, 2009).  We now know more about the competitive effect on the TPS 
in each state with charter school laws on the books.  What we do not know is if that 
competitive effect works the same with vouchers as it does with charters.  Matthew Carr 
(2009) and David Figlio (2010) are two researchers who have published research in this 
new area (Carr, 2009; Figlio, Hart, & Urban Institute, 2010), and in both cases, they had 
only a few years of data with which to work.  This study will attempt to expand this 
research because of access to several more years of data. 
Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the competitive effect of vouchers on 
the traditional public school as measured by changes in the quality of education measured 
by performance indicators.  This study focusses on the EdChoice “voucher” program in 
Hamilton County, Ohio.  Hamilton County is home to Cincinnati Public Schools as well 
as several suburban districts.  School performance as measured by the Performance Index 
Score (PIS) is compared before and after the EdChoice program was introduced in 2006.  
Carr (2009) was working with only two years of data, and now there are six years of data 
after vouchers were introduced available for evaluation.  The long-term effects or trends 
of the voucher program on TPSs in Hamilton County are now observable.  Hamilton 
County Ohio was chosen because it has a smaller data set that is fairly representative of 
the entire state.  Cincinnati has a healthy mix of urban and suburban schools; high 
performing and low performing schools; poverty and wealth; small and large 
enrollments; and ethnic diversity.   One final advantage is that vouchers are relatively 
new to Hamilton County, unlike the Cleveland Public Schools which introduced vouchers 
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in the mid 1990’s.  Comparable data prior to 1990 are not readily available for Cleveland 
Public Schools, thereby eliminating Cleveland from the study.   
Research Questions 
 
1.  Is the introduction of EdChoice consistent with a statistically significant 
difference in the quality of public education in Hamilton County as measured by the PIS?  
2. How well does time explain the variation in mean PIS scores for voucher 
eligible and non-voucher schools?  
3.  When holding other variables constant, is the threat of vouchers found to be a 
statistically significant predictor of PIS variation for voucher eligible schools? 
4. Do we see an increased incidence of school closings with voucher eligible 
schools in Hamilton County?  
Chapter two reviews the literature available on the competitive effects of school 
choice, charters, and vouchers.  The smallest area of research is on the topic of vouchers, 
and this study will add to this research by studying a well-established voucher system in 
Hamilton County Ohio.  The implications for other states debating this type of legislation 
for educational reform are deep and far-reaching.  Before the education system continues 
down the road of competition and educational choice, educators must take a critical look 











 This review of the literature begins with a broad view of school choice and 
narrows toward the more recent voucher phenomenon that is sweeping the nation.  
School choice includes homeschooling, open enrollment, magnet and charter schools, 
alternative and online schools, and vouchers to attend private schools.  Each state is 
moving through this polarizing repertoire of options at different rates and with differing 
levels of success.   
The second major area in this literature review deals with the idea of competition 
as a catalyst for school improvement.  This concept has been debated philosophically for 
years.  Now that we have more than twenty years of school choice experimentation 
nationwide, researchers and legislators are able to back up their positions with data.  
Many educators believe the competitive effect of charters and vouchers on public schools 
is very similar, so this review of the literature will begin with the largest body of research 
(charters) and narrow toward the research area with the least amount (vouchers).   
The third section focuses specifically on the competitive effect that charter 
schools are having on traditional public schools.  A charter is typically a smaller, retooled 
public school that is exempt from much of the regulation that governs traditional public 
schools.  Charter schools were chosen because most states have had them for many years, 
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and there is a growing body of peer-reviewed research on these schools.  And, unlike 
private school data or homeschool data, the data on charters are publically available, 
making empirical research much easier to accomplish.  This educational concept (the 
charter school) has also been embraced by the educational community more widely than 
other choice options.   
Between the third and fourth sections of the literature review is a sub-section on 
creaming and reverse-creaming.  Much of the research on the competitive effect of 
charter schools narrows in on the issue of creaming or sorting of students.  This question 
is raised by opponents of charters and vouchers who claim that only the best students, 
those who have the most parental support, will take advantage of the voucher or charter 
option and consequently leave the traditional public school.  Then the scores in the 
traditional public schools will go down and the achievement gap will widen.   
The fourth major area narrows even further to the voucher question:  Does the 
threat of the voucher motivate public schools to improve?  Vouchers are public funds that 
are used by students to pay the tuition at private schools, including religious institutions.  
Vouchers are usually the last stop on the school choice bus because of the litigation that 
surrounds church-state separation.  Because the voucher concept is relatively new to the 
education world, research on the competitive effect of vouchers is limited.   
School Choice Trends in the USA 
 
In the American School and University Journal, Kennedy (2007) gives a concise 
description of the changes taking place in public education as states and schools respond 
to the demand for more options.  He uses data from the National Center for Education 
Statistics 2006 survey, "Trends in the Use of School Choice,” to support his premise.  
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Before open enrollment became the norm, parents had little choice but to attend the 
school in whatever district they lived.  Unless they could afford private school tuition and 
transportation, the public school was the only option.  In fact, that is how many families 
shopped for housing.  They chose to live in a school district based on the quality of the 
local public school.  In the past 20 years, that has begun to change.  “80 percent of 
school-age children in 1993 attended the school to which they were assigned; by 2003 
only 74 percent were attending their assigned school” (Kennedy, 2007, p. 20).  With open 
enrollment the norm now in most states, that number will continue to plummet.  
As dissatisfaction with public schools increases, more options become available.   
The survey found that the parents of students enrolled in assigned public 
schools were in general less satisfied with their children's schools than 
parents of students in chosen public schools or private schools.  (Kennedy, 
2007, p. 22) 
Kennedy (2007) also points out that school choice availability to parents varies 
across the country.  More than 61 percent of parents report public school choice options 
in the West, compared to 39 percent in the Northeast, 47 percent in the South, and 58 
percent in the Midwest.  These choice options include charter schools and voucher 
schools, and suddenly Traditional Public Schools (TPSs) are facing a competitive market 
for the first time in United States history.  Schools must now compete for students and 
the state dollars that follow those students.   
Proponents of school choice argue that the entire educational system benefits 
from the competition to attract and/or keep students.  Belfield and Levin (2002) find that 
“increased competition and higher educational quality are positively correlated” (p. 297).  
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This conclusion makes perfect sense to economists, and if it were that simple we could 
adopt it as policy and be done with it.  Opponents of school choice are quick to point out 
however, that it is not that simple when dealing with the complexities of educational 
choice.  Belfield and Levin (2002) recognize this and clarify this finding in the next 
sentence.  “However, the effects of competition on education outcomes appear to be 
substantively modest.  Between one-third and two-thirds of the estimates lack statistical 
significance, and the methods applied are often multivariate regressions (Belfield & 
Levin, 2002, p. 297). 
Yongmei Ni and David Arsen (2011) have done extensive research on this debate.  
They have been researching school choice and competition in Michigan for several years.  
They explain that those in favor of school choice believe that if funding is tied to 
enrollment, TPSs will have “incentive to compete and increase their effectiveness and 
efficiency by working harder and implementing educational improvements” (Ni & Arsen, 
2011, p. 3).  They go on to explain that critics of school choice believe that competition 
will only widen the gap between those with access to quality education and those without 
it.  School choice policies will “create winners and losers relative to the status quo, 
increasing academic, racial, and social class stratification while further concentrating 
many of the most disadvantaged students in schools depleted of the personnel and 
resources needed for improvement” (Ni & Arsen, 2011, p. 3).   
As Ni and Arsen (2011) delve deeper into the reasons that families choose one 
school over another, they find that socioeconomic factors may play a larger role than the 
quality of education in the decision to select another school.  Parents who exercise choice 
options tend to move away from schools with high populations of poverty or minority 
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students.  This finding plays a major role in the competitive effects of school choice.  “In 
short, our results indicate that in Michigan….the market signals these policies provide to 
school personnel have very little to do with the student academic outcomes they strive to 
improve” (Ni & Arsen, 2011, pp. 20-21).  Opponents claim it causes a form of de facto 
segregation, and no educational improvements. 
Public school choice typically begins with open enrollment, a system that drops 
the traditional boundary markers between school districts.  Students can attend any 
school for which they have transportation.  David Welsch and David Zimmer (2010) 
studied Wisconsin’s open enrollment program that was introduced in 1990 and was 
considered by school choice advocates to be a pioneer state in this realm.  These two 
authors were looking at student migration in general.  When a student has the option to 
move out of a district, how does that district respond?  They conclude that when students 
begin moving out of a district, standardized test scores improve slightly in the following 
year.  “In particular, districts that experience a 5 percentage point increase in out-
migration subsequently witness increases of about 4–7 percentage points in the 
percentage of students scoring advanced or proficient” (Welsch & Zimmer, 2012, p. 206).  
They also conclude that schools typically focus more on preventing out-migration than 
attracting in-migration of students.  This shows that, at least in Wisconsin, TPSs are 
affected by student migration.  What it does not show, is whether the overall educational 
quality increased. Further study is required to show the cause of the test score increases.  
Open enrollment is now mandated by NCLB 2002 for schools that are failing to make 
Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) for two consecutive years, and many states have 
adopted legislation allowing this basic level of choice for all schools. 
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At the other end of the public school choice spectrum is the voucher option, 
where public dollars can be directed to private, often religious schools.  Although this 
concept is still hotly contested at the state level, in 2002 the United States Supreme Court 
ruled in Zelman, Superintendent of Public Instruction of Ohio, et al, v. Simmons-Harris et 
al., “that vouchers did not violate the Establishment Clause, thus leading the way for 
voucher programs throughout the United States” ("NCSL," 2012).  
Ironically, both political parties have embraced the school choice movement to 
varying degrees, although the implementation and regulation is still debated. 
The major difference in the current voucher discussion is, in speculation, 
that successful parties will embrace the winds of political change ushered 
in by a historical presidential election and an ecumenical coalition calling 
for comprehensive school reform. Just as Senator Blaine embraced 
nationalism in lieu of political and religious conflict, both former Speaker 
of the House Newt Gingrich and the Rev. Al Sharpton have united to 
embrace President Obama's vision for school reform. This phenomenon 
signals a bipartisan platform for school reform that may recast the school 
choice debate. (Sutton & King, 2011, p. 265) 
Literature in the area of school choice trends in the United States suggest that the 
current political climate nationwide has swung the pendulum in favor of vouchers, 
charters, and choice. Percentages of students attending charters and private schools are 
up.  Homeschooling is continuing to rise nationally.  Movement is trending away from 
the TPS which is no longer the only game in town.  Vouchers aimed at low income 
families are allowing this segment of the population into the educational choice arena for 
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the first time. Wherever these publicly-funded choices have been challenged, even on the 
grounds of separation of church and state, courts have decided in favor of expanded 
choice, thereby taking students, money, and resources from the public schools.  The 
reason for this shift is not so much that charters or vouchers have been proven effective, 
but a general and growing dissatisfaction with the public school system in America.   
Competition as a Catalyst for School Improvement 
 
 School choice as a movement was started on the premise that parents should have, 
as the name implies, choice in the education of their children.  Somewhere along the way, 
another purpose was added by education reformers.  They looked at traditional public 
schooling and asked these questions: What if school choice could be a motivator for 
schools to improve?  Would schools work harder to keep or attract students and the 
money attached to them by the state?  Would TPS students ultimately perform better on 
achievement tests as a result of this increased competition?   
George Holmes and others (2006) compared test scores in schools before and 
after competition was introduced in North Carolina and found that charter school 
competition serves to increase the overall academic performance of traditional public 
schools.  Using seven measures of the impact of charter-school competition, Holmes et 
al. found that four of the seven measures were statistically significant while the other 
three measures were just short of statistical significance.  The authors concluded that: 
All else being equal (including the school's score on the performance 
composite the previous year) the presence of charter-school competition 
increases traditional school performance by about 1 percent. This 
represents more than one-half of the average achievement gain of 1.7 
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percent made by public schools statewide between 1998-99 and 1999-
2000 and is, from a policy perspective, nontrivial. (Holmes et al., 2006, 
pp. 69-70) 
Holmes et al. (2006) begins his concluding sentence (above) with the phrase, “All 
else being equal…” and the fact is that not all else is equal.  The temptation is to compare 
the performance of the public school before and after competition is introduced, and if 
scores improve, assume it was a result of the competition.  After studying traditional 
public schools in Michigan, Ni and Arsen (2009) are cautious about that conclusion.  
They suggest that the benefits of choice policies on educational outcomes in traditional 
public schools have not yet been established.  “While it is appropriate to be cautious 
about drawing strong policy implications from extant research, the results thus far are 
hardly compelling” (Ni, 2009, p. 24).  Correlation does not equal causation. 
That is not to say that there are no TPS benefits associated with choice 
competition.  Public schools are forced to think creatively when enrollment is dropping 
and funding is disappearing.  In Kansas City Missouri, almost twenty percent of the 
students are now enrolled in charter schools (Kennedy, 2007).  The district 
superintendent, Anthony Amato, took this “opportunity” to realign the buildings and 
programs that were left and eliminate the middle schools altogether.  It was found that the 
new preK-8 configuration resulted in “more efficient use of facilities; fewer transitions 
between schools; improved attendance and achievement; fewer discipline problems; 
better curriculum articulation; increased parental involvement; longer-term relationships 
with teachers; and students having the same school schedule as younger siblings” 
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(Kennedy, 2007, p. 23).  These benefits cannot be discounted and are a direct result of 
students leaving the TPS for local charter schools. 
The findings regarding the impact of school choice on motivation for school 
improvements are mixed.  Much depends on the location that is being studied and the 
methodology used by each researcher.  Ni (2009) studied Michigan and found no positive 
effect of competition on the traditional public schools.  She states that after a dozen years, 
the Michigan schools are just as bad as they have ever been.  Holmes (2006) seems to 
find reason for a more positive outlook in North Carolina, where charter school 
competition has helped raise the traditional school performance by 1 percent.  This is 
significant because it represents more than half of the achievement gain for public 
schools in a 3 year period.  Kennedy (2007) uses data from the National Center for 
Education Statistics to show the shift away from public schools and toward educational 
choice alternatives. His statistics are 6 years old, but a quick check of the current 
numbers show that this trend has not slowed.   
One limitation in these studies on competition and school performance is that it is 
not merely economics being studied.  Schools, human behavior, and learning are being 
evaluated; and these are not strictly supply and demand; input and output issues.  The 
following questions must be asked:  Was the increase in test scores a result of the new 
teaching techniques and engaging curriculum, or was it a result of the natural sorting that 
took place as a result of competition?  The difference here is critical.  If one goal of 
educational choice is to prompt schools to approach learning differently and improve 
their craft, it will be a failure if students are only sorted and rearranged.  This point is 
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actually made in the next section on the competitive effects of charters when Bohte 
discusses creaming and reverse creaming. 
The Competitive Effect of Charters on Public School Performance 
 
 Marcus Winters (2012) conducted a study on the effect of charters on public 
schools in New York.  He recognized that most of the attention and research surrounding 
charters is focused on the performance of the students who left for the charter schools.  
Winters studied the effect on the students who were “left behind” in the public schools 
and found small but positive effects on educational achievement for students who stayed 
in public schools when given the choice to move to charter schools.  Winters suggests 
that the competition created by the charter school movement has not harmed student 
achievement.  He finds that these results are consistent with the results of previous 
studies which looked at the effect of school choice on academic outcomes of students at 
public schools (Winters, 2012).    
The most important contribution of this paper is its focus on measuring the 
influence of school choice in a large urban setting. The finding that public 
school students benefit, though slightly, from competition from charter 
schools provides some encouragement for those who would continue to 
expand the charter school sector in American cities. (Winters, 2012, p. 
301) 
Kevin Booker et al. (2008) studied charter schools in Texas and found that the 
presence of charter schools had a positive effect on student test performance for the 
students who remained in public schools.  The authors further found this effect in both 
reading and math as well as in “both district and campus level penetration measures, and 
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across a variety of specifications” (p. 143).  It was concluded that the presence of school 
choice, in the form of charters, may result in systemic gains. It was not clear from this 
study whether the same gains would be achieved from the institution of broader choice 
systems such as vouchers. 
Future research on the charter experiment which focused upon identifying 
the sources of gains from competition would help inform the general 
relevance of our findings. The relevance of school choice policies within 
the current policy environment rests upon the accumulation of evidence, 
such as ours, that children who stay behind are not necessarily left behind. 
(Booker et al., 2008, p. 143) 
John Bohte (2004) conducted a similar study in Texas which looked at how the 
presence of charter schools impacts the achievement trends of high school students 
enrolled in traditional public schools across the state of Texas.  He compared the overall 
pass rate on the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) prior to and after charter 
school competition was introduced.  His interpretation of what he finds is interesting.   
A 1 percentage point increase in countywide charter school enrollments 
(as a proportion of total enrollments) is associated with a 0.10 percentage 
point increase in district pass rates on TAAS exams the following year. 
There is clear evidence that charter schools are having an impact on the 
performance of students in traditional public schools. (Bohte, 2004, p. 
511) 
 This seems like a very small percentage point increase after one year of 
data to be claiming “clear evidence” of an impact on TPS student performance.  
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To his credit, Bohte (2004) does use the results of a Texas Center for Educational 
Research survey completed by more than 300 superintendents to obtain some 
qualitative data.  “At least a small part of the performance gains among students 
in traditional public schools are likely the result of policy changes initiated by 
administrators concerned about the impact of funding losses that result charter 
competition” (Bohte, 2004, p. 515). 
As Bohte (2004) searches for the reasons for his “clear evidence” he finds 
“a much greater percentage of the performance gains among students enrolled in 
traditional public schools likely result from the movement of at-risk students to 
charter schools” (p.515).  One interesting piece of information about Texas 
charters is brought out by Yongmei Ni and David Anderson in The Charter 
School Experiment (2010) edited by Lubienski and Weitzel.  They note that 
roughly one half of the Texas charters were designed for at-risk students.  As 
these students pull out of TPSs, the scores will naturally rise.   
Creaming & Reverse-Creaming 
 
John Bohte (2004) is getting down to the issue of how charter competition may 
naturally produce higher test scores, depending on the design or purpose of the charter. 
Critics of charter schools and school choice in general argue that 
competition will lead to creaming, in which the best students transfer to 
choice schools and, leaving traditional public schools with the burden of 
teaching weaker students.  An equally valid concern is whether choice 
creates an avenue for “reverse creaming,” where administrators in public 
schools purposely encourage the transfer of weaker students to charter 
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schools in order to focus on less resource-intensive student populations. 
(Bohte, 2004, p. 516) 
Patrick McEwan in his 2004 study of Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Chile calls the 
phenomenon “cream-skimming” when higher level students are removed from the public 
school to participate in some level of school choice.  
The mounting evidence on sorting suggests that cream-skimming could 
lower the achievement of remaining public school students.  This is not 
necessarily a concern if the achievement declines from sorting are 
outweighed by gains from competition.  However, most of the literature 
on private school competition does not suggest that gains would be large.  
More alarmingly, it is not at all clear that research succeeds in identifying 
the causal effect of competition. (McEwan, 2004, p. 76)   
The flaw in his evaluation of this possible explanation is that the ends justify the means.  
If the goal of competition is really school improvement, one should not be satisfied with 
creaming or sorting of students to improve the data.  And, as he points out, the gains from 
competition are not significant enough in the research to outweigh any achievement 
losses. 
Ni and Arsen in Lubienski’s (2010) book, The Charter School Experiment, 
identify and neatly summarize eleven studies on the competitive effects of charter 
schools.  Large urban district data or statewide data from Michigan, Arizona, Ohio, 
Texas, North Carolina, and Florida have all been studied since 2000.  What they find is 
the results are “…mixed, with three studies finding negative competitive effects, three no 
effects, and five positive effects.  Where positive effects have been found, they are 
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generally quite small” (Lubienski & Weitzel, 2010, p. 115).  The authors identify the 
problem of mixed results as the inability of researchers to remove the self-selection bias 
of the students.   
The preceding studies looked at the effect of charter schools on the public school 
students that were left behind when their classmates enrolled in charters.  Winters (2012) 
found that public schools who actually lost students to charter schools were unaffected by 
the competition, or showed mild benefits in English and math scores.  Bohte (2004) adds 
to the research by zeroing in on which student demographic remaining in the public 
schools benefits most from the presence of a charter.  The strongest performance gains 
are found in the low-income students.  Bohte (2004) goes on to define “creaming” and 
“reverse creaming” as two likely results of charters that may have more to do with school 
performance than the competitive effect of charters.  Booker (2008) finds “robust 
evidence” that students who are “left behind” in public schools when some students 
choose to attend a nearby charter school are not really being left behind.  In fact, their 
achievement scores in math and reading improve.  Ni and Arsen in Lubienski (2010) 
summarize the charter school competitive effects as early and inconclusive.  “Charter 
school competition is a very blunt policy tool for bringing about needed reforms in urban 
schools” (p. 118). 
Examples of Competitive Effects of Vouchers on Public School Performance 
 
The final area to be explored in this literature review is the competitive effect of 
vouchers on public school performance.  Vouchers that pay for private school tuition 
seem to be the last battle that school choice advocates fight in each state.  Because 
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vouchers cross the church-state divide, states have been slow to pass this legislation.  
However, several states have led the way into this final frontier.  Florida is one of them. 
David Figlio & Cassandra Hart studied the competitive effect of Florida vouchers 
in 2010 and found that “…all four measures of competition are positively and 
significantly related to student performance (p.23).  This study looked at the distance 
between the TPS and the closest private school accepting vouchers.  The authors find that 
every mile closer to the private school increases TPS performance in math and reading by 
at least 0.014 of a standard deviation.  Likewise, an increase in the number of private 
schools available nearby correlates to an increase in test scores.  “While these estimated 
effects are modest in magnitude, they are very precisely estimated and indicate a positive 
relationship between private school competition and student performance in the public 
schools” (Figlio et al., 2010, pp. 23-24).  At first glance, it seems that TPSs are 
responding positively to the threat of vouchers in Florida.  More research is needed to 
determine the cause of these test score increases.   
Matthew Carr’s 2009 dissertation on the Ohio EdChoice program and the effect it 
is having on public schools is the study that most closely resembles the research 
questions and methodology in this study.  It is here that the review of literature is focused 
to its narrowest point.  Carr’s findings and how he achieved them will be explained, the 
flaws will be critiqued, and the new questions, methodology, and findings will be added 
to the growing body of knowledge on this topic.  
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Carr’s research questions include the following: 
(1) Will traditional public school buildings where students are eligible to 
use a voucher see significant changes on indicators of overall proficiency 
in math and reading than buildings not so threatened?  
(2) Will traditional public school buildings where students are eligible to 
use a voucher see significant changes on indicators of advanced or limited 
proficiency in math and reading than buildings not so threatened?  
(3) Will traditional public school buildings where students are eligible to 
use a voucher see significant changes on indicators of administrative and 
personnel policies (proximal effects) than buildings not so threatened? 
(Carr, 2009, p. 139) 
Carr addressed his research questions by evaluating data from 2003 to 2008 using 
a fixed-effects regression design.  The study focused closely on the outcome data from 
2006, the year that vouchers were introduced in Ohio.  While few effects were observed 
on overall proficiency passage rates following the introduction of vouchers, voucher-
threatened schools did show significant gains in the percentage of students moving out of 
the lowest performance category and in the percentage of students moving into the 
highest performance category. (Carr, 2009, p. 139) 
Through his proximal effects models (addressing research question 3), Carr also 
found that “voucher threatened schools increased resources for staff support, reduced 
student truancy, and increased their focus on discipline” (Carr, 2009, p. 139).  This third 
research question is probably the most important because it gets to the heart of the 
improvement question.  Did public school administrators make a concerted attempt at 
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change or did they just ride out the voucher competition and hope the less successful 
students take the voucher option – reverse creaming? 
Carr (2009) did his research on the EdChoice program only three years into the 
program.  He saw that schools faced with the threat of vouchers focused their efforts on 
the highest and lowest performers.  These students were identified as the ones most likely 
to take advantage of the voucher and leave the TPS.  He found little overall change in the 
passage rates on state testing.  The competitive effect of vouchers in Ohio was negligible. 
Review of research related to the competitive effects of vouchers on public school 
performance suggests that voucher-threatened schools are not harmed by the threat of 
voucher schools in the neighborhood.  Some TPSs even show slight improvement and the 
greater or closer the competition is to the public school, the greater the growth associated 
with it.  However, we must be careful with these findings.  Some research indicates that 
the effect is caused by sorting of students, not the positive response to competition that 
choice advocates may claim.  Many are interested to know if the effect has changed over 
time.  Now that the Ohio EdChoice program has six years of data, the results of this study 












 The methodology for this study was driven by the research questions which are 
listed again in the next section.  The goal was to isolate the voucher effect on the 
performance of the traditional public school as measured by the Performance Index Score 
(PIS).  Carr used individual student scores from a few specific, grade-level tests to 
attempt to isolate the voucher effect on the PIS scores for that school.  The methodology 
for this study looks at the relationship between voucher-threatened schools and schools 
not threatened by vouchers.  It also compares the annual growth in PIS before and after 
the voucher threat was introduced.  A multiple regression is used to compare the effect of 
other common predictors of performance with the voucher effect.  Finally, a chi-square 
test of independence is used to determine if voucher-threatened schools are closing at a 
faster rate than their non-threatened neighbors.  These four tests should give reliable 
answers to the questions below: 
Research Questions 
 
1.  Is the introduction of EdChoice consistent with a statistically significant 
difference in the quality of public education in Hamilton County as measured by the PIS?  
2. How well does time explain the variation in mean PIS scores for voucher 
eligible and non-voucher schools?  
25 
 
3.  When holding other variables constant, is the threat of vouchers found to be a 
statistically significant predictor of PIS variation for voucher eligible schools? 
4. Do we see an increased incidence of school closings with voucher eligible 
schools in Hamilton County?  
 Ohio was chosen as the focus of this study for two reasons: (1) Ohio has a 
relatively long and established history with educational choice, charter schools, and 
vouchers.  The Ohio EdChoice program has stood the tests of time, scrutiny, legislation 
and litigation.  (2) Ohio has an excellent department of education website that has made 
the raw data available to the general public: http://ilrc.ode.state.oh.us/Downloads.asp.  On 
this particular page one can find disaggregated, downloadable, reports going back to the 
2000-2001 school year.  These reports can then be exported as Excel files for further 
sorting and statistical analysis.  Another very useful page on the website is the Power 
User Reports (http://ilrc.ode.state.oh.us/Power_Users.asp) which can be used to create 
custom reports with the specific information needed.  A researcher can identify by 
county, school district, or individual school building, and then disaggregate the data for 
socio-economic status, disability, race, or any other subgroup.  Each of the statistical 
models will still require cleaning and sorting, but starting with good, solid, readily-
available, raw data is crucial to further study and peer review.  
 As was explained near the end of Chapter One, Hamilton County has one of the 
best representations of school districts across the state of Ohio.  Three other large, 
metropolitan school districts in the state were considered for this study, but were 
eliminated for separate reasons.   Cleveland was eliminated because that particular 
voucher program was started in 1995 and data prior to the introduction of vouchers are 
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not readily available.  This fact alone makes it more difficult to study the competitive 
effect of the voucher program in Cleveland over time, which is a focal point of this study.   
Columbus was eliminated for the opposite situation.  Columbus has several very 
affluent neighborhoods with excellent schools.  Very few inner-city schools were 
threatened by the voucher option, and therefore the EdChoice program would most likely 
have had very little competitive effect.  Akron was the final option considered, and 
although it has a fairly good representation, it is substantially smaller in size and number 
of schools compared to Cincinnati.   
Instrumentation 
 
 The Performance Index Score (PIS) is another unique feature that Ohio 
introduced in 2000.  This score is derived from a formula that takes into account all of the 
Ohio Achievement Assessment (OAA) results of students from third through eighth 
grades and the Ohio Graduation Test (OGT) results from grade ten.  Higher proficiency 
scores receive more weight than lower proficiency scores and then each school is given a 
PIS from zero to 120.  The PIS is helpful in that it collapses all the test data for each 
school into a single score.  This score and formula have remained unchanged since it was 
introduced in 2000.  For research purposes, especially when comparing overall school 
improvement over time, this is a very useful data point.  Since the researcher is looking 
for the competitive effect of vouchers on the overall performance of the TPS, the bulk of 
the statistical research will focus on this score.   
 The reliability and validity of the PIS are directly related to the reliability and 
validity of the OAA and OGT.  Because the weights are pre-determined, and based on the 
level of achievement on these assessments, which are also reliable, each these scores are 
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calculated, researchers will achieve the same results.  These scores are standardized.  
Because the PIS is tied directly to the performance scores on the achievement exams, 
which are also standardized, the researcher is testing what he intends to test, making the 
PIS valid by definition.  Higher scores on the assessments will result in a higher 
Performance Index Score for the school.   
Variables 
 
 The dependent variable in the first few tests of this statistical research is the 
percent change in the PIS.  The independent variables are (a) Voucher or Non-Voucher 
schools based on Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) designation and represented by a 
dummy variable, one or zero, and (b) Time.  The schools in the voucher threatened 
category received a rating of “D” or “F” for three years in a row and are designated by 
the dummy variable “one”.  The other schools, not immediately threatened by losing 
students to vouchers, are represented by a “zero”.   
 For research question three, a set of control variables are included that are 
commonly attributed to the performance indicators of a school: discipline referrals, 
minority population, expenditures per pupil, highly qualified teachers, and socio-
economic status.  These are independent variables that, when changed over time, often 
have an effect on school performance.  They are analyzed along with the independent 
variable of voucher eligibility or not, again represented by a “one” or a “zero”.  The 
dependent variable remains the PIS.   
 The final test uses a discrete variable based on whether or not a school survived 
all six years after the introduction of vouchers.  For this particular test, the independent 
variable remains as “voucher eligibility” and the dependent variable is "school closing".  
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However, the nature of these variables is different than that of the continuous variables 
utilized in the other tests.  That is to say, they are binary, discrete variables (yes or no).  
Either the school was voucher eligible, or it was not.  Either the school closed, or it did 
not.  Thus, a special test was used to accommodate these variables—a Chi-Square Test of 
Independence.   
Procedures 
 
 The research began by separating the voucher eligible schools from the non-
voucher eligible schools and running a simple t-test: paired two-sample for means.  This 
test helped to determine if each group had statistically significant change between 2007 
when vouchers were introduced, and 2012, the most recent year for which data are 
available.  To begin to isolate the voucher effect, the PIS was compared for schools 
before and after 2007, when vouchers were introduced.  Did performance change at the 
same rate before and after vouchers, or did we see a difference in rate of growth?  The 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) was calculated to identify if the change in growth 
was significant before and after the introduction of vouchers.  The graph of those trend 
lines demonstrates both similarities and differences.  This was followed by a cubic time-
series regression on the voucher group to see if that better represented the trend than a 
linear trend line. 
A time series, multiple regression was implemented to test the categorical 
independent variables.  This tested the variance between the mean PIS for each category 
of school before and after the introduction of vouchers.  Finally, to answer question 
number four, the research called for a Chi-Square Test of Independence to see if the 
voucher-threatened schools closed at a greater rate than non-voucher schools.   
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Threats to Validity 
 
 The threat to validity in this research, as identified by Carr (2009) is regression to 
the mean.  The best control for this threat is to compare the trend before and after the 
treatment in both voucher and non-voucher schools.  To combat this threat, the research 
began with t-tests on the PIS trends before and after vouchers were introduced.  This 
allowed the researcher to compare the rate of growth and possible trend toward the mean 
for both groups, before and after vouchers.  The advantage this 2013 study had that Carr 
(2009) did not have was four more years of trend data after the introduction of EdChoice.  
With the abundance of data available on the ODOE website, this study had as many years 
of data before vouchers as after, which helped increase the validity of the trend lines over 
time. 
 The second threat to validity that often comes up in studies on voucher effect is 
endogeneity, which can be caused by self-selection bias.  This study, like Carr’s (2009) 
study, avoided this issue altogether.  The focus of this research was only on the threat of 
vouchers as determined by a school’s A-F classification.  Regardless if any students 
actually chose to take the voucher and leave the public school, the researcher wants to 
know that school responded to the threat of competition from vouchers?  The self-
selection bias was eliminated from this study by design. 
 The third threat to validity had to do with explanation of the results.  In this 
review of the literature, it was referred to as the “creaming effect” or “reverse creaming”.  
What if the PIS trends up or down, not because schools are responding to the 
competition, but because students are being sorted into schools that better fit their peer 
group, behavior, or socio-economic status?  Those variables were included in the study 
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and were controlled for by studying the change in each variable after vouchers were 
introduced.  Those changes were included in the multiple regression and effectively 
eliminated as factors in the results of this study, especially when compared with the 
voucher effect.   
The final threat to validity is the number of school closings between 2007 and 
2012.  If the voucher-eligible schools closed at a higher rate than the non-voucher eligible 
schools, that would affect the validity of this study.  It would seem to indicate, not that 
voucher threatened schools improved, but that they were forced to close.  Eliminating a 
higher percentage of lower performing schools from one of the groups being compared 
could skew the data upward, giving the impression of improvement, when actually they 
are failing at a higher rate.  The final test of independence sufficiently dealt with this 










Research Question One 
 
Is the introduction of EdChoice consistent with a statistically significant 
difference in the quality of public education in Hamilton County as measured by the PIS?  
The null and alternative hypothesis for this test is stated as follows for voucher eligible 
schools: 
Ho: µ2007-µ2012≥0  
Ha: µ2007-µ2012<0 
When we compare PIS scores for voucher eligible and non-voucher eligible 
schools 5 years after eligibility began, were those scores higher at a statistically 
significant level?  Therefore, two paired sample t-tests were run: the first for voucher 
eligible schools and the second for non-voucher eligible schools in the year 2007.  These 
tests compared the mean PIS score for 107 Hamilton County schools with data in 2007 
and 2012.  The first t-test is 25 schools under the threat of losing students to vouchers.   
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Table 1.  t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means for Voucher Eligible Schools 
Descriptive Data 2007 2012 
Mean 69.036 78.944 
Variance 57.459 70.828 
Observations 25 25 
Pearson Correlation 0.346  
P(T<=t) one-tail 7.52466E-06  
 
The mean PIS jumped from 69.036 to 78.944 during the experimental period when the 
EdChoice voucher program was in full effect.  This is significant at p<.01.   
For comparison purposes, the next t-test involves the other 82 schools in 
Hamilton County that were not in danger in 2007 of losing students to the voucher 
program.   
Table 2.  t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means for Non-Voucher Schools 
Descriptive Data 2007 2012 
Mean 97.562 98.803 
Variance 76.292 92.241 
Observations 82 82 
Pearson Correlation 0.849  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0151  
 
 
The mean PIS for these schools went from 97.56 to 98.80 during the same period, 
which is significant at p<.05.  To summarize, 2007 Voucher eligible schools saw an 
increase in their mean PIS of approximately 10 points.  For non-voucher schools, the 
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increase was just over 1 point.  Both findings were statistically significant, although non-
voucher schools was significant at p<.05 compared to p<.01 for voucher eligible schools.  
We reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant change in the PIS after the 
introductions of vouchers, and accept the alternative hypothesis which suggests there was 
a statistically significant jump in mean PIS for voucher eligible schools.  This suggests 
that there is a relationship between the introduction of vouchers and the PIS in Hamilton 
County, Ohio. 
Research Question Two 
 
What if the Hamilton County schools were already growing at a similar rate prior 
to the introduction of vouchers?  This brings us to research question two. How well does 
time explain the variation in mean PIS scores for voucher eligible and non-voucher 
schools?  Here, the predictor variable is time, and we can compare the results across 
voucher eligible and non-voucher eligible schools.  Prior to utilizing time as a variable to 
predict the variation in PIS scores, it is helpful to explore the rate of growth occurring 
across both school categories (before and after vouchers were introduced).  Specifically, 
the null and alternative hypotheses for this test are stated as follows (both voucher 
eligible and non-voucher eligible): 
Ho: µCAGR01-06 - µCAGR07-12≤0  
Ha: µCAGR01-06 - µCAGR07-12>0 
 
As mentioned, the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) allows us to 
compare—not just a change in scores—but the rate of growth across voucher and non-
voucher eligible schools.  This is important in order to tease out the velocity of growth 
between school categories and make a distinction between them. 
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A t-test (assuming unequal variances) will tell if the difference in the growth rate 
is significant.  Table 3 shows the results of the CAGR for all schools in Hamilton County, 
which can be used to compare each subset to the group norm. 
Table 3. t-Test: Assuming Unequal Variances for All Hamilton County Schools 
Descriptive Data CAGR 2001-2006 CAGR 2007-2012 
Mean 6.03 0.827 
Variance 228.88 3.75 
Observations 107 107 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000306221  
 
The mean growth for all Hamilton County schools went from 6.03 PIS points per 
year, to .827 PIS points per year.  This is a drastic decrease in the rate of growth which 
could be attributable to two major variables:  the introduction of vouchers or the change 
in the state tests, both of which came in the same school year.  The state test scores are 
the primary determinates of the PIS for each school.  Either way, we notice a major 
slowing in the rate of growth since 2006.   
Here is what we see with schools that are eligible for vouchers in 2007: 
Table 4.  t-Test: Assuming Unequal Variances for Voucher Eligible Schools 
Descriptive Data CAGR 2001-2006 CAGR 2007-2012 
Mean 14.48 2.75 
Variance 890.79 7.21 
Observations 25 25 




This test shows significance at p<.05.  Compound Annual Growth before vouchers was a 
little more than twice the rate of the county.  After 2006, the CAGR for voucher eligible 
schools is more than three times the rate of the rest of Hamilton County.  Below are the 
results of the non-voucher schools: 
Table 5. t-Test: Assuming Unequal Variances for Non-Voucher Schools 
Descriptive Data CAGR 2001-2006 CAGR 2007-2012 
Mean 3.45 0.242 
Variance 6.814 1.29 
Observations 82 82 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0000  
 
This t-test indicates that growth also slowed for the non-voucher schools.  Prior to 
vouchers, the compound annual growth was half the rate of Hamilton County.  After 
vouchers, the growth rate slowed to less than one third that of the rest of the county.  All 
three tests were significant at p<.05 for a one-tail test.   
The Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) comparisons between voucher and 
non-voucher eligible schools reveal that voucher eligible schools demonstrate a more 
robust rate of growth than the county average or non-voucher eligible schools over a 
similar period.   
Another way of illustrating this effect is through a time-series regression model.  
In a time-series regression, “time” is the independent variable used to explain the 
dependent variable, which in this case is mean PIS for the period 2001-2012.  The Null 
and Alternative Hypothesis are stated as follows: 
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Ho: β1+ β2+ β3 = 0 
Ha: β1+ β2+ β3 ≠ 0 
Note: The beta coefficients are time variables (x, x^2, and x^3).  In other words, 
by rejecting the null hypothesis, we are concluding that time—whether expressed as 
linear (x), quadratic (x^2), or cubic (x^3)—is a good predictor of the dependent variable, 
which in this case reflects mean PIS scores. 
The results are as follows: 
 
Table 6.  Time-Series Regression for Non-Voucher-Schools 
Regression Statistics      
R Square 0.9665      
Standard Error 1.0875      
Observations 12      
       
         ANOVA       
  df   F Significance F  
Regression 3   76.85 0.00  
Residual 8      
Total 11         
       
  Coefficients Standard Error  P-value   
Intercept 78.4581 1.78  0.0000   
Period  5.1843 1.14  0.0019   
Period^2 -0.4646 0.20  0.0481   
Period^3 0.0142 0.01  0.1968   
 
Before describing the output, it is important to recognize what is taking place in a 
time series regression. As mentioned, time is the explanatory variable with mean PIS 
scores by year being the dependent variable.  In a regression model, two primary 
questions need to be addressed.  First, is there a relationship between the predictor 
variable(s) and the dependent variable?  Second, what line best approximates this 
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relationship?  In this particular model, there is a strong relationship, but a straight line 
(linear) was not the best line to approximate the relationship.  Thus, a cubic (polynomial) 
line of best fit was used to describe the variation in the dependent variable.  
Consequently, this line provided the highest r-squared values for both voucher and non-
voucher schools (meaning that it could explain more of the variation in the dependent 
variable: mean PIS).   
From a model perspective, we notice two things.  First, the r-square is .966.  This 
means that time explains nearly 97% of the variation in PIS scores for non-voucher 
eligible schools.  Second, the F-statistic is significant at p<.01.  This means that the 
model is found to be a statistically significant predictor of the dependent variable.   
While r-squared values were high for both time-series models (voucher and non-
voucher eligible schools)—the coefficients tell us something important about the trend 
lines for PIS growth.  For the non-voucher schools, the coefficient on the cubic variable 
(x^3) was positive, implying that we might expect the third “period” of this model to 
have a positive increasing trendline.  Although the coefficient value was positive, it was 
not found to be statistically significant.  In other words, where the x and x^2 values fit the 
line well, the x^3 value did not.  This implies more of a dome shape than the S-shaped 
curve typical of a cubic model where coefficient values for x, x^2, and x^3 are positive, 
negative, and positive accordingly.  This is illustrated in table (7) below.  
 It is interesting to contrast this model with the voucher eligible time-series 
regression.  Similar to the non-voucher model, this model (Table 7 below) has a high r-
squared value (95.5%) and a statistically significant F-value (implying that the model is 
good for prediction purposes).  Moreover, we see that the values for x, x^2 and x^3 have 
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coefficient values of positive, negative, and positive (similar to the non-voucher time 
series model).  However, we see that x^3 is statistically significant in this model, 
implying that the third period in the line of best fit does, indeed, trend upward.  This is 
also illustrated below in Table 7. 
Table 7.   Time-Series Regression for Voucher Eligible Schools 
Regression Statistics      
R Square 0.9552      
Standard Error 2.1471      
Observations 12.00      
       
        ANOVA       
  df   F Significance F  
Regression 3   56.81 0.00  
Residual 8      
Total 11         
       
  Coefficients Standard Error  P-value   
Intercept 35.3765 3.51  0.00   
Period 13.8048 2.25  0.00   
Period^2 -1.9125 0.39  0.00   
Period^3 0.0892 0.02  0.00   
 
Based on this information, we reject the null hypothesis for the time series 
regression model and accept the alternative (time does explain the variation in mean PIS).  
The null for the time series regression is that there is no relationship between time and 
PIS scores.  There is a relationship between time and PIS scores, and it is a cubic 






Figure 1. Graph Comparing Change in PIS over Time - Hamilton County 
 This graph reveals that all schools are showing growth in PIS between 2001 and 
2006.  Then, something is introduced that causes all schools to show a decline in the 
performance index.  Most researchers presume that this dip is caused by the new state 
assessments that were introduced in 2007 to several million students, not the threat of 
several thousand students taking vouchers.  This dip will be discussed further in the final 
chapter of this study.   
 The line of best fit for voucher eligible schools is a polynomial line from a cubic 
regression.  After 2006 is where we see the greatest difference in growth for the voucher 
eligible schools.  When we evaluate the formulas for the cubic regression we can see a 
significant difference in the values that are multiplied by x: In the first sequence 13.805 
for the voucher schools, and 5.183 for the non-voucher schools.  It is also apparent that 
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the polynomial line for non-voucher schools seems to plateau at the end, while the line 
for voucher schools is arcing sharply upward.  The voucher-threatened schools make up a 
lot of ground as they head toward 2012.  The achievement gap is closing between the 
voucher-threatened schools and the non-threatened schools.  It went from a 37 point gap 
in 2001 to a 20 point gap in 2012.   
 Closing the achievement gap between the between failing schools and exemplary 
schools cannot be overstated.  This is an issue that everyone involved in education is 
trying to address.  Legislators, superintendents, teachers, reformers, and researchers are 
all working to close this gap.  It appears that one solution to closing this achievement gap 
in Hamilton County involves the competitive effect of EdChoice on the public education 
system.   
Research Question Three 
 
To validate this claim, however, it is necessary to control for other variables that 
might play a role in PIS variation—thus, the third research question: When holding other 
variables constant, is the threat of vouchers found to be a statistically significant predictor 
of PIS variation for voucher eligible schools?   
H0: Vouchers do not have an influence on the variation of the PIS (when adding control 
variables to the regression model).  
Ho: β1+ β2+…+ βn = 0 
Ha: β1+ β2+…+ βn ≠ 0 
 This is where it can get tricky.  Is it possible to isolate the voucher effect when 
there are so many variables that impact the performance of a school?  To do this one must 
isolate the 135 schools in Hamilton County that had data in both 2007 and 2012.  This is 
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a different set than was studied in the first part of this research because that previous 
analysis could only include schools that had performance scores every year from 2001 to 
2012.  Now that we are looking at demographic data and a shorter span of years, more 
schools can be included in the study.   
 A snapshot of school data in 2007 and in 2012 included each control variable, and 
using a multiple regression, identified significant factors in the determination of the PIS.  
The dependent variable is the percent change in the PIS between 2007 and 2012.   The 
independent variables are as follows: 1. Voucher eligible in 2007; 2. Percent change in 
discipline infractions; 3. Average percent minority students; 4. Percent change in 
expenditure per pupil; 5. Average percent highly qualified teachers; 6. Average percent of 
economically disadvantaged students.  The multiple regression will indicate which of 
these independent variables has the greatest effect on the PIS scores between these two 
years.   
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Table 8.  Multiple Regression for all Hamilton County Schools 2007-2012 
Regression Statistics     
R Square 0.323413483     
Standard Error 0.114421497     
Observations 135     
      
    ANOVA      
  df F Significance F  
Regression 6 10.19749501 3.30797E-09  
Residual 128    
Total 134       
      
  Coefficients Standard Error  P-value  
Intercept -0.142330249 0.169679898  0.403136236  
2007 Voucher Eligible? 0.197615695 0.028962187  3.18603E-10  
% Change Disc. -0.000380748 0.001218046  0.755101377  
Ave. % Minority -0.021702055 0.055669989  0.697307189  
% change in $ -0.00381025 0.028864682  0.895188487  
Ave. % HQ Teachers 0.178056366 0.164470301  0.281019026  
Average Econ Dis -0.021167698 0.061564615  0.731539065  
 
 None of the p-values are significant EXCEPT the p-value for whether or not the 
school was eligible for vouchers in 2007.  This is a “Dummy Variable” where if the 
school was eligible they get a 1 and if they weren’t eligible they get a 0.  Thus, we say 
that going from a 0 to a 1 (non-voucher eligible to voucher eligible) is like adding an 
additional 19.76% to a school’s % change in PIS Scores (the coefficient associated with 
this variable). 
With an F-value for significance well below .01 we see that this model has 
predictive power at a statistically significant level.  However, when we look at the p-
values for each individual predictor variable, the only variable for the 135 included 
schools that has significance is the voucher eligible variable at p<.01.  And with a 
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coefficient value near 20%, we see that vouchers have a significant positive relationship 
with the percent change in PIS. Going from a non-voucher eligible school to a voucher 
eligible school is associated with a .19 or a 19% increase in PIS from 2007 to 2012.  This 
provides evidence that voucher eligibility is a good predictor of the variation in PIS.  We 
can safely reject the null hypothesis that vouchers do not have an effect on the PIS when 
other variables are held constant.  No other variable in this model accounts for as much of 
the Performance Index Score variation as does the voucher variable.   
Some may point out that the R-squared (or the coefficient of determination) only 
accounts for about one-third of the variation in PIS (.323 or 32.3%).  However, this value 
is acceptable when studying human behavior.  The variables included in this study are the 
same variables that educators often use to explain why a school improvement initiative 
will or will not work.  These demographic indicators are some of the best available to 
predict individual student performance.  However, when applied to a whole school 
growth model or predictor of school performance, they just do not hold up.  Other 
variables that may have an influence on test scores like curriculum implementation, 
instructional strategies, or teacher motivation have not been included in this study, even 
though these variables would most likely play a role in explaining the variation in the 
dependent variable (% change PIS).  However, most of them cannot be “modeled” or 
captured in a regression model.  For example, motivated teachers would likely influence 
student performance, but one cannot simply put “motivation” into a regression model.    
 The first three research questions have helped to substantiate the use of vouchers 
as a means to improve public school performance.  In other words, voucher eligible 
schools that were still around from 2007 to 2012 do better.  That is the good news.  Is 
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there another side to that coin?  A common charge against vouchers is that they 
accelerate school closings.  So, criticism might be that voucher eligible schools do better, 
if they survive, but if vouchers cause a lot of public schools to close they are not really a 
catalyst for improvement.  As the data were being collected for these tests it was difficult 
to find enough schools in Hamilton County that had data for the entire twelve year 
period.  Some schools began well and then the data ends at 2009, so that school was 
eliminated from the study.  It can be assumed, based on the state and federal sanctions for 
school improvement that these schools had failed to make Adequate Yearly Progress 
(AYP) and were summarily closed or reorganized.  Other schools only have data from 
2007 on and it seems that these were the reorganized schools that were born out of the 
death of a failing school.  The data seemed to indicate that schools either made significant 
improvement and stayed open, or did not make improvement and were forced to close or 
reorganize.  It is only fair to investigate this claim, even if it derails the entire study. 
Research Question Four 
 
The final research question is this:  Do we see an increased incidence of school 
closings with voucher eligible schools in Hamilton County?  
To answer this question, a Chi-Square “test of independence” was run to help 
determine whether a relationship existed between voucher eligibility and school closings.  
A Chi-Square test explores relationships between discrete, or categorical, variables—
making it a natural fit for the two variables of interest (voucher eligible=yes/no; school 





Ho: Voucher eligibility and School Closings are independent; no relationship 
Ha: Voucher eligibility and School Closings are not independent; related 
In 2012, 280 Hamilton County Schools were in existence, but 63 of those schools 
did not exist in 2007 and were removed from this test.  We are only interested in schools 
that were open in 2007 and whether or not they were still open in 2012.  That leaves 217 
schools with data and this group of schools comprises the final data set. Of these 217 
schools, 43 closed between 2007 and 2012.  This left 174 schools that survived this 6 
year period.  Figure 2 illustrates the data. 
 




Most educators understand that if a school does not show Adequate Yearly 
Progress, it will eventually be taken over by the state, reorganized, or shut down.  It 
seems to reason that if a school is eligible for vouchers, it is not only in danger of losing 
students and money, but it is also in danger of being closed.  It appears that the 
proportions are in line with what we would expect.   
As we can see from the graph, Hamilton County had 43 schools close between 
2007 and 2012 and 174 schools that did not close during this period.  This means that 
nearly 20% or one out of five schools, voucher or not, closed or reorganized.  On the left 
set of columns there is a higher than average ratio of voucher-eligible schools that closed 
(12/43=27%).  On the right side we see only 23% (50/217 = 23%) of all Hamilton County 
schools are eligible for vouchers.  Another way to look at it is that 24% (12/50=24%) of 
all voucher-eligible schools closed their doors between 2007 and 2012.  This is higher 
than the average of 20%.   
The fact remains that a greater percentage of voucher eligible schools did close in 
Hamilton County.  The question remains, is it different enough to be statistically 
significant?  To find out, it was put to a statistical test: a Chi-Square test of independence.  
Table 9 has the results. 
47 
 
Table 9.  Chi-Square Test of Independence for School Closings in Hamilton County 
 
Was the School Voucher Eligible in 2007? * Did the School Close Between 2007 and 
2012?  Crosstabulation  
N=217 Schools in Hamilton County 
Did the School Close 
Between 2007 and 2012? 
Total Yes No 
Was the School  
Voucher Eligible in 
2007? 
No Count 31 136 167 
Expected Count 33.1 133.9 167.0 
% within Was the 
School Voucher 
Eligible in 2007? 
18.6% 81.4% 100.0% 
Yes Count 12 38 50 
Expected Count 9.9 40.1 50.0 
% within Was the 
School Voucher 
Eligible in 2007? 
24.0% 76.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 43 174 217 
Expected Count 43.0 174.0 217.0 
% within Was the 
School Voucher 
Eligible in 2007? 
19.8% 80.2% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Test Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided)   
Pearson Chi-Square .716 1 .397   
N of Valid Cases 217     
 
 
This table restates that nearly 20% (19.8) of all schools in Hamilton County 
closed their doors or reorganized between 2007 and 2012.  Twenty-four (24%) of the 
voucher-eligible schools closed their doors during the same period compared with 18.6% 
of non-voucher schools.  If these percentages are different enough, the Pearson Chi-
Square value will be less than .05.  In this analysis, the Pearson Chi-Square is .397, which 
is not statistically significant because the P-value is > .05.  Is there a relationship between 
voucher eligibility and school-closings?  According to the chi-square output, there is not.  
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  Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis which states that there is no 
relationship between school closings and vouchers in Hamilton County.  According to 
this test, we have enough evidence to say that the two are independent of each other.  
Therefore, this would not fit with a narrative claiming that voucher eligibility exacerbates 
school closings—at least in Hamilton County. 
Summary of Results 
 
The four research questions that drove this study were answered by the data 
returned.  The first question asked if there was a significant difference in the PIS for 
voucher and non-voucher schools, before and after vouchers were introduced.  The model 
found that there is significance at p<.05 for non-voucher; p<.01 for voucher.  In Hamilton 
County Ohio there is a significant change in the PIS after the introduction of vouchers for 
both types of school.  The second question attempted to isolate time as a variable and 
identify the shape of the trend line before and after vouchers were introduced.  Using the 
Compound Annual Growth Rate and a time-series regression, time was found to be a 
significant variable in the change in PIS for all schools.  Once again, however, voucher 
eligible schools grew at a faster rate than the non-voucher schools, and closed the 
achievement gap by 17 PIS points.   
The next step was to use a multiple regression to isolate the voucher effect from 
five other variables that could have played a role in changes in the PIS for each school 
after the introduction of vouchers.  The voucher variable was the only one that had a 
statistically significant effect on the PIS.  And the final step was to determine if voucher 
eligible schools were closing or reorganizing at a higher rate than non-voucher schools.  
The finding of the chi-square test of independence was that schools threatened by 
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vouchers are not closing at a higher rate, statistically, than schools not threatened by 
vouchers.  Chapter five will discuss what this means for the traditional public schools in 









 The question of competition in education has been debated and tested for 
generations, and it will continue to be debated for generations to come, especially when it 
includes vouchers.  This study adds only a trifle to that conversation, and is by no means 
conclusive.  However, some interesting conclusions can be drawn from the data coming 
out of Hamilton County, Ohio in the wake of the EdChoice program introduced in 2006.   
 This chapter is divided into three sections.  The first section presents the purpose 
and methodology of this study.  In the second section, the conclusions reached for each of 
the four research questions and the null hypotheses are discussed.  The final section 
presents recommendations for further research on the competitive effect of vouchers.  In 
addition, the final section offers implications from the research for state legislators who 
are currently debating this issue.   
Purpose and Methodology 
 
 The purpose of this study was to investigate the competitive effect of vouchers on 
the traditional public school as measured by changes in the quality of education measured 
by a Performance Index Score for each school.  Initially, the concept of a voucher was 
primarily promoted as a tool to equalize educational opportunities for parents.  Now that 
vouchers are being touted by legislators as a catalyst for public school improvement, 
educators want to know if it is working as claimed.   
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This study focused on the EdChoice “voucher” program in Hamilton County, 
Ohio, which is home to Cincinnati Public Schools as well as several suburban districts 
surrounding the inner-city.  School performance was measured by the Performance Index 
Score (PIS) which is a comprehensive rating for each school building based on test scores 
and other education data benchmarks.  The purpose of this study was to attempt to isolate 
the voucher effect from the other major effects on the PIS, and determine the significance 
of that effect. 
The methodology for isolating the voucher effect began with a comparison of the 
mean trendline for voucher-threatened schools prior to the introductions of vouchers, and 
the mean trendline for schools not threatened by vouchers.  Is there a relationship 
between the mean Performance Index Scores and the introduction of vouchers?  It also 
compared the compound annual growth rates in performance scores before and after the 
voucher threat was introduced.  A time-series regression was employed to determine the 
relationship that time had as an explanatory variable and the line of best fit.  A multiple 
regression was used to compare the effect of other common predictors of performance 
with the voucher effect.  Finally, a chi-square was used to determine if voucher-
threatened schools closed at a faster rate than their non-threatened neighbors.  These tests 




Research Question number 1: Is the introduction of EdChoice consistent with a 
statistically significant difference in the quality of public education in Hamilton County 
as measured by the PIS?  We rejected the null hypothesis that there is no significant 
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change in the PIS after the introductions of vouchers.  There is a positive relationship 
between the introduction of vouchers and the PIS in Hamilton County, Ohio at p<.05 for 
all public schools.  In fact, if a school is threatened by a voucher, the mean increase in the 
PIS is almost 10 points, and the significance increases to p<.01.  Whereas the mean 
increase for public schools not threatened by vouchers is just over 1 point and is 
significant a p<.05.  Although the research might have stopped here, this statistic does not 
convince the reader or the researcher.  How do we know that vouchers were responsible 
for the increase in the mean PIS?  What if the mean PIS for both groups was already 
growing at a similar rate before the introduction of vouchers?  There are still too many 
unanswered questions.  So we press on to the second question. 
Research question 2:  How well does time explain the variation in mean PIS 
scores for voucher eligible and non-voucher schools?  This question was answered in two 
parts.  The null and alternative hypotheses for the first test are stated as follows (both 
voucher eligible and non-voucher eligible):  There is no change in the Compound Annual 
Growth Rate (CAGR) for the six years prior to the introduction of vouchers, compared to 
the six years after the introduction of vouchers.  We rejected the null hypothesis and 
found that there is a significant change in both voucher and non-voucher threatened 
schools at p<.05.  For voucher eligible schools, the Compound Annual Growth before 
2006 was a little more than twice the rate of the county.  After 2006, the CAGR for 
voucher eligible schools was more than three times the rate of the rest of Hamilton 
County.  And non-voucher threatened schools dropped to one third the growth rate of the 
rest of the county.   
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The null hypothesis for the second test involving time was stated as follows: 
There is no change in the PIS over time for Hamilton county schools.  We rejected the 
null after running the time-series regression because in fact there is a relationship 
between time and PIS scores, and it is a cubic (polynomial) relationship.  For non-
voucher threatened schools, the third iteration of time is not significant, p>.05, but for 
voucher-threatened schools, the third iteration of time is significant at p<.01.  What this 
shows is that in 2008, two years after vouchers were introduced, the PIS for non-voucher 
schools leveled off.  However, the PIS for voucher-threatened schools began to arc 
sharply upward again and continue to rise.  This was the information that Carr (2009) did 
not have when he completed his research in 2009.  This shows the influence that time has 
had on the PIS for voucher-threatened schools.   
In chapter 4 it was noted that there is a significant dip in test scores that ultimately 
affect the PIS for each school.  In 2006 the Ohio State Achievement Tests hit their peak, 
and then in 2007 we see a drop in scores across the state.  The state tests were changed to 
include more stringent standards and subsequently scores went down.  This follows the 
pattern of any new education initiative where schools see an implementation dip.  
Interestingly, the public schools not threatened by vouchers have essentially plateaued 
since 2008.  They did not rebound like the voucher-threatened schools did.  It could be 
concluded that the competitive effect of vouchers continues to help drive scores upward.  
But before we draw that conclusion, we must investigate the potential that other variables 
could have on the PIS, which leads to the next research question.   
Research question three: When holding other variables constant, is the threat of 
vouchers found to be a statistically significant predictor of PIS variation for voucher 
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eligible schools?  The null hypothesis states that vouchers do not have an influence on the 
variation of the PIS. A snapshot of school data in 2007 and in 2012 included each control 
variable, and then, with a multiple regression, identified significant factors in the 
determination of the PIS.  The dependent variable was the percent change in the PIS 
between 2007 and 2012.   The independent variables were voucher eligible in 2007, 
percent change in discipline infractions, average percent minority students, percent 
change in expenditure per pupil, average percent highly qualified teachers, and average 
percent of economically disadvantaged students.   
The multiple regression indicated which of these independent variables had the 
greatest effect on the PIS scores between these two years.  The only variable that had any 
significant effect on the PIS was the voucher variable at p<.01, and this effect accounted 
for 19% of the percent change in the PIS between 2007 and 2012.  Voucher eligibility is a 
good predictor of PIS.  We can safely reject the null hypothesis that vouchers do not have 
an effect on the PIS when other variables are held constant.  No other variable in this 
model accounts for as much of the performance indicator score as does the voucher 
variable.   
This test also indirectly addresses the “creaming” or “reverse creaming” debate 
that presented itself in the Review of Related Literature (Chapter 2).  If creaming was 
actually taking place, then these other demographic variables would have a greater effect 
on the PIS than the data indicate.  It seems that if some sort of creaming is taking place, 
and students are being sorted based on race or socio-economic status, it is having no 
measurable effect on the change in PIS of these schools.   
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The results of the first three research questions established the voucher-effect as a 
catalyst for traditional public school improvement.  It seems that voucher-eligible schools 
are closing the achievement gap with non-voucher threatened schools and the PISs for 
these schools are headed in the right direction.  The final research question was included 
to investigate the claim of voucher critics that while some schools improve to avoid 
losing students to vouchers, the rest are just being shut down.  Perhaps that would 
account for some of the improvement.  Because those underperforming schools are not 
included in the study, we really do not see the full picture.   
Research question four:  Do we see an increased incidence of school closings with 
voucher eligible schools in Hamilton County?  The null hypothesis was “voucher 
eligibility” and “school closings are independent”; there is no relationship.  What we 
found is that roughly one fifth of all schools, voucher or not, closed in Hamilton County 
between 2007 and 2012.  Voucher-eligible schools did close at a slightly greater rate in 
Hamilton County.  To find if this difference is statistically significant it was put into a 
statistical test: a Chi-Square test of independence.  The results of the Chi-Square test 
found that there was no statistically significant difference in the rate of school closings 
between voucher and non-voucher threatened schools.  Therefore, we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis.  There is no relationship between voucher eligibility and school closings 
in Hamilton County, Ohio.   
In conclusion, traditional public schools in Hamilton County, Ohio have little to 
fear when it comes to competition posed by voucher eligibility.  It seems that schools are 
responding positively to that threat, performance is improving, and voucher-threatened 
schools are in no more danger of closing than those not threatened by vouchers.  When it 
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comes to change in the PIS, minority populations, families in poverty, discipline 
infractions, per-pupil spending, and teacher certification have less to do with school 
performance than the competitive effect of EdChoice (voucher) legislation.   
Recommendations and Implications 
 
It is interesting to watch each state debate the pros and cons of educational choice.  
Charters, vouchers, and educational choice are moving across this country at varying 
rates, and these changes should be made cautiously and circumspectly.  Ohio is one state 
that seems to be leading the way when it comes to educational choice, and the voucher 
program they have established applies specifically to schools that have been failing for 
three years out of five.  This seems to intensify the competitive effect of the voucher 
program, because these schools would feel the financial loss of these students 
immediately and profoundly.   
Some states, like Indiana, have implemented voucher programs that are much 
more comprehensive, but actually mitigate the competitive effect of the voucher.  In 
Indiana, all students from any school district are eligible to apply for a voucher.  And 
when those monies are applied to a private school, a little bit is taken out of the pot for all 
public schools.  For education choice proponents, Indiana is preferred over Ohio.  
However, for those promoting vouchers as catalyst for school improvement, some of the 
competitive effect is lost in Indiana.  Even if zero students from a given school take a 
voucher, that school will still lose revenue because the total pot of money for public 
education is reduced.  Alternatively, if a significant number of students leave a particular 
school to take a voucher, the financial impact is spread over all the schools in the entire 
state.  Of course the school that lost students to vouchers will also lose the funding it 
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would have received from those students.  For the competitive effect of vouchers to 
produce results similar to what we found in Hamilton County, Ohio, the program must be 
similar.   
Now, since this research was completed, legislators in Ohio voted in 2013 to 
expand the EdChoice Scholarship Program to include all low-income students from any 
school.  Apparently the effect of vouchers on failing schools was significant enough to 
justify applying the rules to any school in the state.  The changes will begin with the 
kindergarten class in the fall of 2014 when low-income students from A, B, and C rated 
schools can also apply for vouchers in Ohio.  And the cap on EdChoice scholarships 
which was set at 14,000 for the past 6 years has been increased to 60,000 scholarships.  It 
will be interesting to see if the exemplary schools who are now threatened by vouchers 
will see an increase in performance scores.  If an exemplary school has plateaued 
performance, the competitive effect of vouchers may be able to prompt an increase.   
Recommendations from this study are as follows: 
1. Legislators who want to use vouchers as a catalyst for TPS improvement 
should follow an implementation model similar to the EdChoice program in 
Ohio.  Do not assume that all voucher programs are the same.  This one is 
unique and should be researched thoroughly, especially considering the recent 
changes. 
2. Be sure the voucher program is comprehensive enough to provide real 
educational choice for parents in the lowest performing schools.  This should 
always remain the primary purpose for vouchers. 
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3. The voucher program should not penalize schools that are showing continuous 
improvement and/or exemplary status.  Although if an exemplary school has 
plateaued, vouchers may be a viable option to promote performance growth. 
4. Be sure that the vouchers are taken directly from the funding from the school 
that is consistently failing, so that they feel the direct effect of the competition 
for those dollars. 
If these recommendations are followed, a voucher program may have a similar, 
positive, competitive effect on the performance of the traditional public school.  This is 
the beginning of the research on competitive effects of vouchers, and much more must be 
done.   
Also, there were several questions raised during the research that are outside the 
scope of this study.  These would be great questions for further research: 
1. Why did the voucher-eligible schools show improvement in the PIS? 
2. What professional development, staff training, curriculum, or program 
changes were made in response to the vouchers that may have affected the 
PIS? 
3. When a voucher eligible school was forced to close, what happened to the 
students?  Where did they go?  Did they perform at a higher level after 
attending another school? 
4. When a voucher eligible school reorganized, did the students show 
improvement in the new model?  Currently, there is no easy way to follow the 
schools that reorganize to see the result.  The Ohio State Department of 
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Education does not publish this information, but this would be a very 
interesting study. 
5. What percentage of students in these schools actually takes a voucher, and do 
school administrators and staff really perceive this as a threat to the funding or 
viability of their school?  Is this threat enough to prompt systemic changes? 
6. As Ohio expands the EdChoice Scholarship Program to include all schools, 
will the exemplary schools with plateaued performance show increases in the 
PIS?  Will the competitive effect of vouchers be able to push through the 
performance ceiling at the top of the scale? 
Summary 
 
 The new face of education in the United States of America includes a measure of 
competition.  And vouchers, which will probably claim a relatively small market share of 
that system, are here to stay.  Educators can either fight these programs or embrace them, 
but they can no longer be ignored.  The results of this study indicate that vouchers should 
not be feared.  In Hamilton County, Ohio, vouchers are not causing the traditional public 
schools to close their doors disproportionately.  In fact, the EdChoice (voucher) program 
seems to be having a positive effect on the performance scores of their previously failing 
schools.  The achievement gap is closing as scores from these voucher-eligible schools 
continue to rise.  The students in the traditional public schools in Hamilton County, Ohio 
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